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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A., 
§78-2-2(3)(k) (1953) as amended. Pursuant to U.C.A.. §78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court 
transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter, upon transfer by the Supreme Court, pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2a-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW BY APPELLANT 
The Appellee and Cross Appellant, hereafter Lee Barney, accepts Appellant, Jon 
D. Siddoway and STFs, hereafter referred to as "Siddoway," statement of the issues, 
but disagrees with the characterization of the issues and Siddoway's statement of the 
proper standard for review. These points will be addressed in the argument below. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS 
APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying and refusing to award pre-
judgment interest to appellee on damages granted to Barney and consistent with U.C.A. 
§15-1-1. The determination to award pre-judgment interest is a question of law and is 
reviewed under the "correctness standard." Hurley v. Board of review. 767 P.2d 524 
(Utah 1988). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant Barney additional 
damages, particularly as it related to underpayment of wages and excess benefits taken 
by Siddoway. The Court found the parties had an agreement, but in failing to award 
1 
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damages based on the undisputed evidence the Court abused its discretion, Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co,. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court 
or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of 
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 (c)(1). Judgments; costs. 
"Demandfor judgment. Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his i 
pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or 
among themselves." 
i 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 102. Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth 
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be { 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
4. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. -
< (a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground < 
2 
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of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it 
was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the 
making of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being 
suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of 
proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention 
of the court. 
5. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by 
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends 
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or 
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all 
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other 
preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice 
require, or when an accused is a witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a 
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues 
in the case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to 
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
6. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006. Summaries. 
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which 
3 
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cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a 
chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made 
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a 
reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in 
court. 
7. Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1. Interest rates-Contracted rate-Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the 
subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any 
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or 
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
 { 
8. Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(k) (1953). 
9. Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4). 
10. Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Barney brought an action against Siddoway seeking an accounting from 
Siddoway for both the corporation Standard Tile, Inc., hereafter "STI" and the 
partnership S&B Storage. In all respects, the corporation was run more like a 
partnership than a corporation. There were no books and records kept by the 
corporation, no minutes of meetings, and Siddoway was in control of the corporation, < 
its assets, and made all of the decisions without consulting Barney. Barney was invited 
to work with Siddoway and become a "partner" in STL, receiving the same benefits as 
< 
4 
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Siddoway was receiving from the corporation with the exception that any bonuses at 
year end would be divided with 75 percent going to Siddoway and 25 percent going to 
Barney. The relavent facts are set forth below. 
Siddoway formed STI in 1986. Siddoway later approached Barney and 
requested Barney go into business with him. Both Siddoway and Barney had been in 
the tile business for a substantial period of time. In 1989, when Siddoway approached 
Barney, Barney had a going business with employees and contracts. Barney was to 
receive a salary and benefits equal to that of Siddoway and bonuses from STI would be 
divided with 75 percent going to Siddoway and 25 percent going to Barney. The parties 
also agreed that they would be partners in all future business endeavors, on a 75/25 split 
as set forth above. 
At the end of the first year, Siddoway told Barney that he would have to 
purchase the 25 percent stock in STI, and that the cost would be approximately book 
value or $25,000.00; $1,000.00 per percentage point of stock in STI. Even though this 
had not been part of the original agreement, Barney reluctantly agreed. Siddoway 
represented to Barney that the book value of STI was $100,000.00. In fact, the book 
value was actually $22,000.00. 
In 1991, the parties formed an additional business relationship, i.e. a 
partnership which purchased real property and storage units, S&B Storage. 
In February of 1996, Siddoway fired Barney and locked him out of STI and 
S&B Storage. 
5 
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On July 17, 1996, Barney filed a complaint in Third District Court seeking to 
recover damages alleging money was owed by Siddoway to Barney as a result of the 
parties business relationships. The complaint also sought an accounting from Siddoway 
for both the corporation and the partnership. The case was tried in a three day bench 
trial commencing February 17th and continuing through February 19, 1999. The Court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, as well as its Order and Judgment on 
June 7, 1999. The parties resolved and settled the S&B Storage matters after trial and 
Siddoway paid Barney. Siddoway filed his appeal, alleging error regarding certain 
rulings by the Court as it related to STI and Barney's interest therein. Barney cross-
appealed. / —W:vr . -f'\,^. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS < 
1. Standard Tile Inc. a Utah corporation, was organized in 1986, by 
Siddoway. Siddoway owned 100 percent of the stock of that coq^oration (Record No. 
735; Transcript p. 28). 
2. Sometime prior to March of 1989, Siddoway approached Barney for the 
purpose of becoming a shareholder or "partner" in STI, and also becoming a partner 
with Siddoway in all future business endeavors. The parties reached a verbal agreement 
sometime prior to March 31, 1989, regarding Barney's participation with Siddoway in < 
6 
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become effective April 1, 1989, was as follows: 
a. Barney would become an employee of STI, just as Siddoway was 
an employee of STI; 
b. Barney would have the right and or opportunity to purchase up to 
25 percent of the stock in STI from bonuses; and 
c* Barney and Siddoway agreed that both parties would receive the 
same monthly salary commencing April 1, 1989, and continuing thereafter. 
d. The parties agreed that each would receive and use the benefit of a 
company vehicle beginning April 1, 1989, and thereafter. 
€• The parties agreed that any profits from the corporation or 
operation of the business would be split or divided on the basis of Siddoway receiving 
75 percent of the profits and Barney receiving 25 percent of the profits commencing 
April 1, 1989, and thereafter (Finding No. 6(e)). 
4. At the end of 1989, Siddoway represented to Barney that the value of the 
corporation was $100,000.00 and Barney would therefore be required to pay into the 
corporation $25,000.00 in order to purchase 25 percent of the stock in STI (Record No. 
736; Transcript pp. 200-201). 
5. Based on the representation of Siddoway, Barney reluctantly agreed to 
pay up to $25,000.00 for 25 percent interest in STI or $1,000.00 per percentage point of 
stock in STI (Record No. 736; Transcript p. 201). 
6. At all times relevant hereto, Siddoway controlled all the financial aspects 
7 
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including the checking account. At no time did Barney have the right to sign any checks 
on the corporation checking account or to withdraw funds from any corporate account 
or charge on any corporate account (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 114, 137, and 138). 
7. The corporate books and records including shares of stock, stock register, 
minutes of meetings, etc. were lost by the company accountant, Tuber Okuda, in either 
1993 or 1994 (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 100 and 101). Siddoway offered no 
explanation as to why the corporate books and records were not kept at the office of 
SIX 
8. Following the loss of the corporate records, no minutes were kept of any 
meetings thereafter. No notices of meetings or waiver of notice for any meeting was 
prepared after the original books and records were lost (Record No. 735; Transcript p. 
1 0 1 ) . — - • • • • , * > > , ^ c : ^ r - * • ^ .'•'••/. .; ;. ^ ^ ; ••' 
9. No corporate resolutions were ever passed after the records were lost 
(Record No. 735; Transcript p. 101). 
10. Siddoway was in charge of establishing and declaring bonuses. No bonus 
was declared in 1989 (Record No. 735 & 737; Transcript pp. 41, 310, 311, & 377). 
11. As bonuses were declared, Barney's bonuses first went to pay off his 
account under accounting code 136, loans to shareholders. Taxes were taken out and the 
net bonus was applied to purchase of stock (See Exhibit 24 & 27). 
12. In 1991, there was a bonus, but the money from the bonus was put into 
S&B Storage (Defendant's Exhibit 24; Record No. 735 & 736; Transcript pp. 50, 209). 
8 
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13. In 1992 and 1993, Barney's bonus went to pay his 136 account with STI 
(Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 419, 420, & 544-560). 
14, Barney paid $14,500.00 out of his bonuses toward purchase of stock at 
the following times and in the following amounts: 
Date of purchase Amount 
November 30,1990 $1,500.00 
December 31, 1990 $7,000.00 
December 31,1994 $6,000.00 
Total $14,500.00 
15. In 1995, Barney was allocated a net bonus of $5,370.00 that was never 
paid and should have been applied toward the stock purchase bringing his total stock 
purchase amount to $19,870.00 or a total of 19.87 percent of the stock at the very least. 
The remaining balance owing for the stock purchase by Barney would have been no 
more than $5,130.00 (Finding Nos. 16 & 17). 
16. Siddoway took benefits and paid personal obligations from corporate 
funds in which Barney was entitled to share. Siddoway also received salary in excess of 
that which Barney was entitled to receive. Barney's share of the excess benefits taken 
by Siddoway far exceeds the $5,130.00 and therefore Barney has paid well in excess for 
his 25 percent interest in the corporation STI and therefore owned 25 percent of the 
shares therein (Finding Nos. 18 & 19). 
17. Some of the examples of Siddoway's excess benefits, and admitted by 
9 
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Siddoway are as follows: 
a. Siddoway had a disability insurance policy paid for by the 
company. Barney did not (Record No. 735; Transcript p. 139). 
b. STI also paid all of Siddoway's medical bills for him and his 
family, but did not pay Barney's medical bills (Record No. 735 & 736; Transcript pp. 
141,142, & 215; See also Exhibit 14). 
c. At one point Barney was not even covered by STI under the 
companies insurance plan and received no benefit relative to that (Record No. 735; 
Transcript p. 143). • • • • ; . 
d. STI also paid automobile insurance on Siddoway's wife's car 
(Record No. 735; Transcript p. 144; Exhibit 14). 
e. Standard Tile, Inc. paid $2,000.00 in 1990, to Dart, Adamson & 
Kasting to represent Siddoway in a dispute which he had with his first wife (Record No. 
735; Transcript p. 147). ( 
f. The corporation purchased Jazz tickets and Siddoway received the 
use of more than 14 of the Jazz tickets (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 148, 149, & 
150). ,;•• v>-v; ' -v,. I ,,..-. . • 
g. Siddoway received and took a bobcat tractor and trailer which was 
not accounted for in any exhibit list (RecordNo. 735; Transcriptp. 152). ^ 
h. Siddoway purchased a spa and Jacuzzi for his home claiming it was 
a medical expense. STI paid for the Jacuzzi. (See Exhibit 14). { 
10 
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18. The corporation was effectively dissolved as of the end of February 1996, 
when the parties no longer worked together and when Barney's employment was 
terminated by Siddoway. Barney and Siddoway were the only shareholders of STL At 
the time the parties terminated the business relationship, the corporation owned certain 
assets, most of which were taken by Siddoway (Finding No. 20). 
19. The accounts receivable, as of termination, were collected and used to pay 
debts and obligations of STI (Finding No. 23). 
20. STI owned certain interests in real property as of the date the parties 
terminated, and the assets and values were as follows: 
a. Lot 202 Hearthstone Estates, net equity $63,545.76; 
b. Lot 202 Hearthstone Estates deposits $7,800.00; 
C. Lot 211 Hearthstone Estates purchase price $38,548.50; 
d. Lot 223 Hearthstone Estates, deposit $500.00 (Finding No. 24; 
Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 17-131; Exhibits 5, 6, & 7). 
21. The total value of real property held by STI and Siddoway as of the date 
the parties terminated was $110,549.26. Siddoway took these lots and homes, 
completed homes on all of the lots and took all of the profit individually (Finding No. 
24; Record No. 735; Transcript p.145-160). 
22. The Court awarded Barney a judgment against Siddoway for 25 percent 
of the value of the real property interests as of the time the parties separated in the 
judgment amount of $27,598.57 ( Finding No. 25). 
11 
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23. The Court found that the total value of the equipment, the vehicles, and 
the furnishings as $44,666.67. Siddoway had taken or received $33,500.00 in value of 
the equipment and Barney had taken or received $10,438.00 in value of the equipment, 
consistent with exhibits 15 and 29 offered in evidence. Barney was therefore entitled to 
a judgment against Siddoway for $729.68 representing the excess of the equipment 
taken by Siddoway up and above that which was received by Bamey. Siddoway took 
the bobcat and trailer and Bamey was not awarded any damages related to the bobcat. 
24. STI had also purchased a Lincoln Continental automobile which was used 
exclusively by Siddoway and Siddoway's wife. The payments on the automobile, for 
the period of two years from 1994 through 1996, totaled $12,402.20 (Exhibits 5, 7, 15, 
& 29; Finding No. 28). J 
25. Bamey and Siddoway were to receive equal benefits from the company 
and because this was an additional benefit received by Siddoway and Siddoway's wife, 
Bamey was entitled to 50 percent of the value of the payments made or judgment in the 
amount of $6,201.10 (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 144, and 145; Finding No. 31). 
26. In February of 1996, Siddoway owed to Standard Tile Inc. the sum of 
$13,415.65 which were additional funds taken by Siddoway. The Court awarded 
Bamey judgment of 50 percent of that amount against Siddoway in the amount of 
$6,707.82 (Finding No. 32). 
27. Bamey no longer worked for STI after the end of February 1996. STI and 
the partnership S&B Storage had substantial assets in February of 1996, and Siddoway < 
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took control of all of the assets. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A- SUMMARY OF RESPONSE TO APPEAL. 
The trial court properly determined that Bamey was entitled to 25 percent 
ownership in STL The evidence is clear from Siddoway and Mr. Okuda, the company 
accountant, that Barney owned 16.2 percent of the stock, and at trial Siddoway took the 
position that Bamey only owned 14.5 percent. Bamey was allocated a bonus 1995, 
which could and should have been applied to the purchase of stock consistent with the 
parties prior practice giving Bamey almost 20 percent of the stock. Bamey testified that 
there was no requirement to purchase stock as part of the parties original agreement, but 
was approached almost a year later by Siddoway with the requirement that he pay for 
the stock. 
The payment for the stock was based on Siddoway's representation of 
$100,000.00 value of the business, when in fact the business in 1989 was worth no 
more than $22,000.00. Bamey was therefore a 25 percent shareholder based on monies 
paid in and the parties agreement. The Court determined that Siddoway had taken 
excess benefits from the corporation which more than exceeded any amount Bamey 
would otherwise have to pay for the stock. Kristi Bamey was in fact prepared and 
qualified to submit the summary to the court regarding the excess benefits taken by 
Siddoway. Her qualifications, knowledge, and expertise go to the weight to be given to 
her testimony by the trier of fact, not to its admissibility. It should be noted that this is 
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an action for an accounting and Siddoway failed to come forward with any evidence. 
The summaries were also proper, consistent with Rule 1006 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and based on documents and information in the control and prepared solely 
by Siddoway and Siddoway's accountant. 
Siddoway's counsel was not prevented or interfered with in his examination. 
Siddoway's counsel had many very long discussions with and arguments with the Court 
about objections. These discussions, nonetheless, did not interfere with Siddoway's 
presentation of the evidence, and the Court did not preclude Siddoway from putting on 
his evidence. ^ 
B. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL. i 
Barney is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law, calculated at the 
i 
rate of 10 percent per annum on the damages awarded by the Court consistent with the 
provisions of U.C.A.§15-1-1. 
Bamey is entitled to an additional judgment representing excess wages taken by { 
Siddoway in violation of the agreement. Bamey was also entitled to additional damages 
relative to all of the excess benefits taken by Siddoway, but to the extent the Court had 
utilized that to achieve Barney's 25 percent interest in STI, Bamey simply requests that 
he be awarded the difference in wages as clearly established by Plaintiffs Exhibit 17. 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPEAL. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
BARNEY WAS A 25 PERCENT STOCK HOLDER OR 
OWNER OF STI. 
The trial court determined, after hearing the evidence, that Barney had more than 
paid for 25 percent of the stock or interest in STI (Finding of Fact No. 15,16,17,18, & 
19). Siddoway attempts to characterize its appeal as an "error in law" to be reviewed 
under a correctness standard, citing State v. Rameriz. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1980). 
The Court's determination that Barney owned 25 percent of STI however, is a 
factual determination and must be properly reviewed under the "clearly erroneous 
standard." Siddoway's arguments, on pages 20 and 21 of the Appellant's Brief, makes 
reference to the specific Findings of Fact the Court made (A copy of the Findings of 
Fact is attached as part of the Addendum to Siddoway's Brief). By referring to the 
Findings, Siddoway must agree that the "clearly erroneous standard" is applicable here. 
Because this is an issue of fact which Siddoway disputes, Siddoway has the 
burden on appeal of marshalling the evidence. See Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338 
(Utah 1999), and Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). Siddoway has 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision. The evidence 
presented which supports the Court's decision included the agreement of the parties that 
Barney would become a 25 percent interest holder or "partner" of Siddoway and STI 
(Record No. 736 & 737; Transcript pp. 201 and 459). Siddoway testified that the 
$25,000.00 for 25 percent of Standard Tile was based on the companies book value of 
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$100,000.00 as of 1989 (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 99-100). Barney testified that 
the original agreement did not involve paying for the stock, but this was something that 
was brought up after the fact (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 101-102). 
Siddoway said the purchase price for the stock i.e. $25,000.00, was based on the 
book value and that he contacted the accountant to "ask him about what it was worth" ,: 
(Record No. 735; Transcript p. 100). Mr. Okuda, the company accountant, testified that 
the book value of the entire company in 1989 was $22,000.00 not $100,000.00. (Record 
No. 737; Transcript pp. 476,477, & 538). Mr. Okuda went on to testify that in 1990, 
the companies book value had only increased to approximately $39,000.00. 
Siddoway attempts to argue in his brief that Barney only purchased 14.5 percent 
of the stock. Siddoway testified, however, that the accountant had calculated Barney's 
ownership interest in the stock for which $14,500.00 had been paid, as an ownership of 
16.2 percent (Record No. 735; Transcript p. 104-105). Mr. Okuda testified to the same 
thing and in fact Siddoway introduced an exhibit through Mr. Okuda (Exhibit 25, 
attached as part of the addendum), which shows stock ownership at 16.2 percent for the 
$14,500.00 paid (Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 424-425). 
Barney was also to have received a net bonus as of December 31, 1995, in the 
amount of $5,370.00 (Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 420-422; Exhibit 24 & 25). 
Barney was never paid this money, but based on the way the parties had always treated 
bonuses, that $5,370.00 should have been applied to the purchase of stock, and the 
Court so found (Finding No. 16). Mr. Okuda also admitted that Defendant's Exhibit 25 ( 
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had been prepared at or near the time of trial (Record No. 737; Transcript p. 415). 
Based on Okuda's accounting, Barney should have acquired approximately 22.6 percent 
of the stock. Siddoway also received benefits far in excess of the purchase price of the 
stock. 
Barney had no discretion in deciding which bonuses would go toward purchase 
stock and which bonuses would be utilized to fund the purchase of the S&B Storage 
partnership property. r 
Barney received no bonus in 1989, and Siddoway received additional income 
and bonuses in 1989, contrary to the agreement of the parties (Exhibit 17; Record No. 
735 & 736; Transcript pp. 41 & 311). The Court properly and equitably found that 
Barney was a 25 percent interest owner in STL 
IL KRISTI BARNEY HAS THE REQUISTE KNOWLEDGE, TRAINING, 
AND UNDERSTANDING TO OFFER EVIDENCE ON ACCOUNTING 
MATTERS. 
The matter of qualification of an expert witness lies in the discretion of the 
Court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984). 
Formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving expert opinion: a 
witness may qualify as an expert by virtue of experience or training. Randle v. Allen. 
862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). 
Mrs. Barney testified that she had obtained an associates degree in accounting 
and had also worked in the accounting area for a number of years (Record No. 736; 
Transcript pp. 291-293). Mrs. Barney also indicated that she was familiar with tax 
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returns, financial documents, general ledgers, etc. and in fact had prepared such 
documents in the course of her employment (Record No. 736; Transcript pp. 291 & 
292). Mrs. Barney's testimony was based on summaries which she prepared after 
examining voluminous business records of STL 
Consistent with Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Mrs. Barney testified 
regarding a fact in issue, i.e. did Jon Siddoway take excess benefits and salary from 
STL in violation of his agreement with Lee Barney. Mrs. Barney had the requisite 
knowledge and skill to examine the business records of STI and formulate the 
summaries introduced including Exhibits 14, 15, and 17. Siddoway, in his brief, uses 
the term "forensic or investigative auditor." Siddoway however, offers no case or statute 
requiring a "forensic or investigative auditor" be used in a case like this or what those 
terms even mean and or the qualifications necessary to be considered a "forensic or 
investigative auditor." 
Mrs. Barney's experience or lack of experience in the accounting area goes to 
the weight of her testimony, but certainly not to her qualifications. J " 
The Court properly concluded that Mrs. Barney's experience was sufficient to 
allow her to examine the books and records and provide the summaries which were 
introduced as evidence. Siddoway failed to put on any rebuttal evidence to Exhibit 14 
a n d E x h i b i t 1 7 . ,;,^ ;^/•••:•;•• 
III. THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED INTRODUCTION OF THE 
SUMMARIES SPECIFICALLY EXHIBITS 14 THROUGH 20. 
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It should be noted that Barney brought this action against Siddoway seeking an 
accounting for both the partnership and the corporation, inasmuch as Siddoway was in 
total control of both. Barney also brought the action for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Barney put on sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. The burden 
then shifted to Siddoway to account and show he dealt fairly with Barney. 
It is clear the parties had an agreement and that Siddoway breached that 
agreement. Exhibit 14, regarding the excess benefits taken by Siddoway, is perhaps the 
best example of the breach of the agreement. Barney and Siddoway both testified as to 
what their agreement was and the Court chose to believe Barney over Siddoway. In 
preparing the exhibits, none of the companies books and records for 1989 were 
available, not even the general ledger. For 1990, only the general ledger was available. 
Siddoway's arguments under point HI, beginning on page 27 of his brief, is really 
addressed to Exhibit 14, which is captioned "Summary of Excess Benefits Taken by 
Siddoway From Standard Tile." The checks and invoices for 1991 were also not 
available, but for the years 1992 forward, copies of all of the checks, check vouchers, 
and invoices, if any were attached to the checks, were provided. In cross-examining 
Mrs. Barney, Siddoway's counsel only asked questions about Exhibit 14 regarding the 
1990 and 1991 information. 
The Court did not award Barney specific damages as it relates to Exhibit 14 
except to give Barney some small credit sufficient to bring him up to the 25 percent 
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ownership of stock. 
Specific examples of Siddoway taking excess benefits, as demonstrated on 
Exhibit 14 as well as other exhibits and testimony in the record, clearly shows an excess 
of benefits sufficient to meet the stock issue. * 
Some of the most obvious examples include: 
1. Check no. 2787, on January 4, 1990, to Dart, Adamson & Casting, in the 
amount of $2,000.00, represents a payment taken from the STI account to pay 
Siddoway's attorneys representing him in a custody battle with his first wife. Siddoway 
admitted this (Record No. 735; Transcript p. 147). 
2. Purchase of Jazz season tickets, as set forth on Exhibit 14, are another 
example, and the Court concluded, based on Siddoway's testimony and the testimony of 
Mr. and Mrs. Barney, that Siddoway received excess benefits with respect to using the 
Jazz tickets and or selling them and taking the money (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 
148-149). -
3. Siddoway also purchased a disability policy to provide him income if for 
some reason he should become disabled. Mr. Barney did not have a similar benefit 
(Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 139-140). 
The Court concluded that the payments on the Lincoln Continental automobile 
utilized by Dawn Siddoway, Siddoway's second wife, was an improper benefit to 
Siddoway. Exhibit 14 demonstrates that insurance and repairs were also made on a 
Chevrolet Corsica which belonged to Dawn Siddoway prior to the purchase of the 
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Lincoln Continental. Insurance and repairs on the Continental were also paid for by 
STL 
STI should not have been paying for insurance and repairs on a Chevrolet 
Corseca. Most of these entries have invoices attached, but these charges were never 
passed through to Siddoway requiring him to reimburse the company (Record No. 735; 
Transcript pp. 144-147). In 1992, Jon Siddoway and Dawn Siddoway were building a 
new home and a substantial number of charges paid for by STI showed delivery made 
to the Siddoway home. Indeed, much discussion was had about a garage door and key 
pad installed in the Siddoway home. When the Court asked Mr. Okuda, the company 
accountant, if this was a proper charge (Record No. 737; Transcript p. 446). Mr. Okuda 
stated that this would not be a proper business expense. 
Siddoway paid all of his personal medical expenses for his entire family through 
STI. Again Barney did not receive a similar benefit (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 
140-141). Standard Tile paid all of the charges on the Visa Gold card held by Dawn 
Siddoway and as set forth in Exhibit 14, many of these expenses on that credit card 
related to the purchase of gasoline in Hanksville, Utah, Bullfrog Marina, and were for 
the Siddoway's personal vacations to Lake Powell. 
In 1994, at the bottom of page 9 of Exhibit 14, Siddoway purchased a Jacuzzi or 
"spa" for his personal residence and classified the same as medical expenses under the 
specific account code 637 for STI. Because of the parties agreement, Barney was 
entitled to an equal share of the benefits provided to Siddoway. Exhibit 14 asks for 25 
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percent of $247,000.00. The proper figure should have been 50 percent of $247,000.00. 
The Court perhaps gave Bamey only $5,100.00 worth of credit which was applied 
toward the purchase of stock in arriving at the 25 percent stock figure. It would seem 
therefore that even if it was error to admit the summary, it was clearly harmless error > 
within the meaning of Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Siddoway in 
his own testimony admits taking the benefits listed above. 
Siddoway, by and through his accountant Mr. Okuda, offered into evidence 
Defendant's Exhibit 27, which is a summary of accounts 135 and 136 in the general 
ledger of STL Account 135 is the loan receivable from Jon Siddoway and account 136 
is the loan receivable from Lee Bamey. (Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 426-432). This 
document perhaps was offered to rebut Exhibit 14. The entries on Exhibit 14, however, 
are separate, apart from, and distinct from all of the entries on Exhibit 27. The entries 
on Exhibit 14 show benefits taken by Siddoway which were not: passed through and 
shown as a debt from Siddoway to the corporation (See Exhibits 5 & 7). 
Mrs. Bamey, with her experience in accounting, preparing financial statements, 
preparing tax returns, etc. clearly has a working knowledge of what is or should be 
considered a proper business expense and what is a personal expense. 
The company accountant, Mr. Okuda, also agreed that personal expenses should 
not be paid for through the corporation (Record No. 737; Transcript p. 433). Again it 
should be noted, however, that Siddoway was in complete control of the financial 
matters of the corporation. Lee Bamey did not have the authority to sign checks for the 
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corporation and had no imput on deciding what bills could or should be paid. When 
asked, Siddoway denied that he was the party that assigned specific accounting codes to 
specific expenses (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 137-139). 
When Mr. Okuda, the company accountant, was asked, he testified that 
Siddoway was the one who assigned the account codes to the business expenses and 
that he (Mr. Okuda) never examined any of the checks or invoices to determine the 
propriety of business expenses (Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 403 & 405). 
With respect to Siddoway's arguments that Exhibit 14 and the other summaries 
do not satisfy Rule 1006 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Siddoway is simply mistaken. 
Rule 1006 provides:
 u 
'The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs 
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the 
form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall 
be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a 
reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in 
court." 
Nothing in Rule 1006 requires that a summary of business records summarize 
everything in the business records. To do so would involve more than the financial 
statements, balance sheets, and general ledger of the company. All of the business 
records were in the possession of Siddoway and Siddoway is the individual who 
prepared the checks, attached invoices to the checks, and supplied the accounting codes 
on the checks themselves. Mr. Okuda, as the companies accountant, prepared the 
financial statements and general ledger for the company based on information provided 
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by Siddoway. 
The duplicates of the company records, which Mrs. Barney utilized, were 
available in court. Siddoway brought to court the original documents and those were 
available for examination and copying., 
Siddoway also attempts to argue that the summaries are improper because they 
do not contain a summaiy of the benefits received by Mr. Barney. Defendant's Exhibit 
27, however, specifically those entries under account 136, demonstrate the checks 
Barney received and which he had to reimburse the company for out of his bonuses. 
Barney received no other benefits than those listed in Exhibit 27 under account 136. 
Siddoway's account 135, should look very similar to Barney's account 136. Exhibit 14, 
however, demonstrates all of the additional benefits received by Siddoway which were 
not included in his account 135. The attorney fees for his custody battle, Jazz tickets, 
gas, insurance, and repairs for the automobile driven by Dawn Siddoway are not 
included in account 135 or Exhibit 27. Siddoway's disability insurance is not included 
in Exhibit 27. The spa or Jacuzzi installed at the Siddoway home is not included in 
account 135 or on Exhibit 27, nor are deliveries of building materials to the Siddoway 
home included on Defendant's Exhibit 27 (A copy of Exhibit 27 is attached as part of 
the Addendum). 
Clearly given the check numbers, account codes, etc. Mr. Siddoway himself 
could have been personally examined either by the Plaintiff or by his own counsel 
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regarding each one of the transactions listed thereon. A copy of the check and the 
invoice for each check could have been introduced as evidence, but that would defeat 
the entire purpose of Rule 1006 of the Rules of Evidence. 
The trial court has a certain degree of discretion in controlling the method and 
manner in which evidence can come in and be presented. The trial court, as a trier of 
fact in a bench trial, has somewhat more latitude in this regard. See Rules 102,103, 104 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See also Super Tire Market Inc. v. Rollins. 417 P.2d 132 
(Utah 1966) and State Dept. of Social Services v. Ruscetta. 742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1978). 
Siddoway's argument with respect to Exhibit 15, the value of the equipment, was 
clarified because both Mr. Barney and Mr. Siddoway testified regarding the exhibits 
and the equipment owned by the company. Any admission of Exhibit 15 to the extent it 
relied on Mrs. Expertise, therefore would be harmless error. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 is a summary of closing documents for real property owned 
by STL The Court chose not to rely on Exhibit 16 to award damages. The Court did, 
however, rely on other documents, primarily the testimony and financial statements of 
STI to award damages as it related to the property (See Exhibits 5 & 7). Admission of 
Exhibit 16 therefore is at best harmless error as well. Siddoway does not dispute the 
evidence or information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit 17, the summary of excess 
wages taken by Siddoway in breach of the agreement between he and Mr. Barney. 
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Siddoway attempts to attack Exhibit 19 on the basis that it summarizes payments made 
on the Lincoln Continental automobile which was used for the Siddoways personally. 
The same information is contained in Exhibit 5, the annual statement from STI for the 
period ending December 31, 1995, and Exhibit 7, the financial statement for the period 
ending December 31, 1994. There was also considerable other testimony relative to the 
Lincoln Continental automobile, who used the automobile, and what Mrs. Siddoway's 
relationship to the company was (Record No. 735 & 737; Transcript pp. 144-146, 561 
&562). .: ^.:ui; v^-v'-' 
Therefore even if Exhibit 19 was improper, it was also harmless error because 
there was additional evidence to support the Court's ruling. The Court did not have to 
rely on Exhibit 19 to make an award of judgment of $6,201.10 relative to the Lincoln 
Continental automobile. 
Siddoway also argues that the summaries violate the hearsay rule. Siddoway 
relies on Shurtleff v. Jav Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980) and the case of 
Trolley Square and Assoc, v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61 (Utah At. App. 1994). In Shurtleffa 
summary had been prepared by the employee of the lessee of a backhoe, itemizing 
problems with the backhoe. In Shurtleff the lessor of the backhoe brought an action to 
recover the costs of repairs to the backhoe made during the term of the lease. The 
Shurtleff case dealt with the Utah Rules of Evidence prior to their amendment. The 
summary was also prepared based on statements from the defendant in the case, the 
lessee of the backhoe. In this case, Mrs. Barney is summarizing information obtained 
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from the documents prepared by Siddoway and kept in the ordinary course of business 
of Siddoway and STL There is no hearsay violation here. 
Once again, Siddoway has not demonstrated that the admission or exclusion of 
the summaries affected the outcome of the case. Siddoway has not marshaled the 
evidence to demonstrate whether or not there is other sufficient evidence to support the 
Court's ruling on the award of damages. Barney submits that there is additional 
evidence even if the exhibits were excluded. Since Siddoway has failed to properly 
marshal the evidence, Siddoway's claim for relief should be denied and the Court 
should affirm the Trial Court's ruling with respect to the exhibits and the admission of 
these exhibits into evidence. 
IV. THE COURT DID NOT INTERFERE WITH SIDDOWAY'S 
EXAMINATION WHICH CONSTITUTED CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
Siddoway claims that one of the errors the Court committed was refusing to 
grant a pretrial motion attempting to limit the evidence. 
The parties were before the Court on December 2, 1998, in a pretrial conference 
(See record pages 82 & 83). The parties were ordered to exchange witness and exhibit 
lists and the exhibits by January 29, 1999. The parties agreed to an extension to 
February 8, 1999. Following that pretrial conference on December 2, 1998, Siddoway 
scheduled the deposition of Lee Barney and Kristi Barney. At the time of the 
deposition, the summaries being prepared by Kristi Barney were not yet prepared, but 
were delivered consistent with the order of the Court and the Stipulation of the parties 
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on February 8, 1999. By contrast, Siddoway's exhibit list and exhibits were not 
submitted until the day of trial, February 17, 1999. Some of the summaries prepared by 
Mr. Okuda, Defendant's Exhibit 24 and Exhibit 27, were not produced until Mr. Okuda 
testified on the third day of trial. The standard of review on appeal is "abuse of 
discretion," and as the Court stated in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937 -
(Utah 1993), the appellate court will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless it is so 
unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of 
discretion. 860 P.2d 937 at 938. 
In this case there is no abuse of discretion in denying Siddoway's motion. 
Clearly the records being summarized are and always have been in the possession of 
Siddoway and Siddoway prepared them. There is no surprise because Siddoway has an 
intimate knowledge of the books and records or should have an intimate knowledge of 
the books and records. 
On direct examination of Mr. Okuda, Siddoway's attorney attempted to have Mr. 
Okuda comment on Exhibit 14, indicating that he (Mr. Okuda) had a chance to go 
through and examine the exhibit prior to trial. 
The Court did not need to delay the trial or exclude evidence. This in part was an 
action for an accounting, equitable in nature. The Trial Court therefore had a great deal 
< 
of latitude in determining the most efficient manner in which to conduct the Court's 
business. See Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. Supra. 
Siddoway next attempts to argue that his cross-examination of Mrs. Barney was < 
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limited. Siddoway cites transcript pages 347 and 348. Upon review, however, it shows 
that Siddoway's counsel was cross-examining Mrs. Barney and apologized in advance 
because he indicated that it would be a very laborious process (Record No. 736; 
Transcript p. 348). The Court and Siddoway's counsel then discussed the matter for 
four pages (Record No. 736; Transcript pp. 348-352). The Court then allowed the 
questioning to continue. At no time did the Court limit the cross-examination. 
The cross-examination then continued for eight additional pages (Record No. 
736; Transcript pp. 352-360). The Court and Siddoway's counsel then discussed the 
matter again for five pages (Record No. 736; Transcript pp. 360-365), but at no time did 
the Court tell Siddoway's counsel he could not continue cross-examining the witness. 
The Court was merely trying to suggest to Siddoway's counsel a more efficient way of 
presenting the evidence the Court needed to hear to decide the case. Clearly there was 
no abuse of discretion in this regard. 
Siddoway next complains that the Court did not allow him to rebut the testimony 
of Mrs. Barney and cites the transcript pages 446 and 447. This was direct examination 
of the company accountant, Mr. Okuda. Barney's counsel objected and asked to voir 
dire the witness as it related to Exhibit 14. On voir dire, Mr. Okuda testified that he had 
not looked at the checks or the invoices contained on Exhibit 14 and therefore was not 
in a position to say whether those charges were proper business expenses or in fact 
personal expenses because he had not seen the backup documentation. Barney's counsel 
objected on the basis that Mr. Okuda had not examined the underlying documents and 
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therefore could not testify as to the propriety of the expenses since he had no 
knowledge of the underlying documents. The objection was sustained (Record No. 737; 
Transcript p. 447). 
The Court and Siddoway's counsel then discussed the matter up to the point of 
recess (Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 453-480). The Court asked Mr. Okuda several 
questions during the course of this discussion. Mr. Siddoway also jumped in 
"uninvited." At no time, however, did the Court limit or preclude Siddoway from 
presenting evidence he chose. Siddoway's counsel simply wanted to continue to argue 
the foundational objection which had been sustained and was unable to convince the 
Court to reverse its ruling on the foundational objection. 
In his brief, on page 38, Siddoway cites to the transcript on pages 460 and 461 * 
indicating some ruling or direction by the Court. Exhibit 14 was not discussed at the 
transcript pages 460 and 461, and therefore the reference in the brief is inaccurate and 
again demonstrates no abuse of discretion on the part of the Court. 
Siddoway's argument regarding cumulative error is without merit, not supported 
by the record, and Siddoway has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the Court. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL. 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO 
BARNEY. 
The law in Utah is clear that prejudgment interest should be awarded on damages 
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where the damage is complete, the loss is fixed at a particular time and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures. Bjork v. April Industries, Inc.. 560 P.2d 315 at 316 
(Utah 1977). In Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 R2d 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) The Court 
stated: 
"Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due 
to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount owing under an 
obligation. L & A DrvwalL Inc. V. Whitmore Constr. Co.,608 P.2d 626,629 
(Utah 1980). In Bjork, as in numerous other cases declaring a party's 
entitlement to prejudgment interest as a matter of law, the interest accrued 
as damages arising out of a valid contract determined to have been breached 
by the other party." (Citations omitted). 
In Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing. 
797 P.2d 438, (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the Court stated that the entitlement to interest is a 
question of law. Consequently, the Appellate Court need not accord any deference to 
the decision below but review them for legal correctness. Hurley v. Board of Review. 
Supra. 
At the close of trial, and after the court had announced its decision, Barney's 
counsel requested clarification on the issue of prejudgment interest. 
The Court responded indicating that he declined to award prejudgment interest 
(Record No. 737; Transcript pp. 637- 638). In this case the Court determined that the 
parties had severed their business relationship, both in a partnership and a closely held 
corporation, in February of 1996, and therefore prejudgment interest should accrue on 
the damages determined by the Court from March 1, 1996, up to and including June 7, 
1999, the date of the judgment. The damages as found by the Court, as it relates to 
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Siddoway and STI, are $41,036.17. (Finding of Fact No. 34; See also Findings of Fact 
Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, and 32). The trial court simply erred as a matter of law 
in not awarding Barney prejudgment interest on the damages. 
U.C.A. §15-1-1 provides the appropriate interest rate i.e. 10 percent. 
All of the damages were fixed by virtue of the evidence presented and fixed as 
the date the parties terminated their relationship. The damages were based on a 
contractual relationship between the parties and on the fiduciary duty the corporation 
and its managing shareholder owed to a minority shareholder, as well as the fiduciary 
duty one partner and shareholder owes to another. The damages were complete when 
Siddoway took control of all of the assets and failed to pay Baniey a reasonable sum for 
the assets Siddoway took. Barney therefore is entitled to interest because it took almost 
three years to get the case to trial, and almost 6 months before the judgment was 
entered. See Uinta Pipeline Corp. V. White Superior Co.. 546 F.2d 885 (Utah 1976). 
See also Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & GunnelL Inc.. 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 
App. 1989) and Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992). 
Bamey is entitled to interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum from March 1, 
1996, to June 7, 1999, on the judgment amount of $41,036.17. That interest figure, as of 
the date of judgment, is $13,423.89. That amount should be added to the entire 
judgment and post judgment interest should accrue on that figure as well. 
As set forth below, Bamey claims additional damages and prejudgment interest 
should also accrue on the additional damages if any. 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. BASED ON THE COURT'S FINDING OF AN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN BARNEY AND SIDDOWAY AND THE TERMS 
OF THAT AGREEMENT, BARNEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
AWARDED ADDITIONAL DAMAGES EQUAL TO THE 
EXCESS BASE SALARY TAKEN BY SIDDOWAY. 
Rule 54 (c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Demandfor judgment. Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or 
among themselves." 
In this case the Court found that the parties reached an agreement. One of 
the terms of which provided that each party would receive the same monthly base 
salary commencing April 1, 1989, and continuing thereafter. This Finding of Fact 
is not challenged by the Appellant, Siddoway, nor is it challenged by Bamey and 
in fact is consistent with Barney's position, understanding, and the testimony 
relative to the agreement reached by the parties in 1989. Bamey introduced 
evidence, primarily Plaintiffs Exhibit 17, a copy of which is attached hereto in 
the addendum and by this reference made a part hereof, demonstrating that 
despite the parties agreement, Siddoway had drawn excess salary. This summary 
exhibit (Exhibit 17) also demonstrates that it is based solely on a monthly salary 
and excludes the bonuses from the calculation. The amount set forth on Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 17 simply demonstrates the amount of base monthly salary drawn by 
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Siddoway in excess of the amount paid to Barney. Barney only asked for 25 
percent of the excess amount, but in reality, Barney was entitled to an equal 
amount of salary as a damage figure to reimburse him for the excess amounts 
taken by Siddoway. Barney is entitled to an additional award of $42,025.00 
which includes an amount equal to the excess salary taken by Siddoway together 
with interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum as calculated on the exhibit, up 
to February 25, 1999. There would, of course, be some additional prejudgment 
interest between February 25, 1999, and June 7, 1999, the date the Court entered 
its order. 
The Court abused its discretion in not awarding the damages for the excess 
salary. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), Morton v. Continental 
Baking Co., supra, and Lysenko v. Sawaya. 973 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. Apps. 1999). 
Exhibit 17 was received by the Court (Record No. 736; Transcript p.310-
311). 
Siddoway's counsel tried to confuse Mrs. Barney relative to her 
calculations as set forth on Plaintiffs Exhibit 17, with regard to salary vs. 
bonuses. (Record No. 736; Transcript pp. 377-386) It should be noted that 
through the exchange between Siddoway's counsel and the Court, Mr. Schmutz 
indicated that he would bring in additional evidence by and through Mr. Okuda to 
clear things up. 
No such evidence was presented by Mr. Okuda or through Siddoway to 
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rebut the evidence offered in Plaintiffs Exhibit 17. Siddoway's counsel implies 
without evidence that perhaps the difference between Siddoway's 1989 income is 
based on a "bonus" he received in 1989. 
There were no books and records for 1989, with the exception of the 
personal tax return of Siddoway. The W-2fs for Siddoway and Barney were 
attached to the tax returns utilized in preparing the summary, Siddoway testified 
that he was probably taking at least $200.00 to $300.00 more a month than 
Barney (Record No. 735; Transcript pp. 32-41). Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should have awarded Barney damages at least 
for the excess wages. The court probably should have also awarded additional 
damages as it related to Exhibit 14, but Barney is not appealing that particular 
issue or requesting an award of additional damages except for the wage claim set 
fbrthherein. 
CONCLUSION 
Siddoway's appeal should be dismissed. Siddoway failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of his claims on appeal and had he done so, the evidence 
would support the Court's ruling in any event. 
Even if the summaries Siddoway claims were improper or inapropriate and 
were received without justification, there was still sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the Court's findings and rulings. Siddoway has not 
demonstrated that the Court abused its descretion in anyway, and therefore 
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Siddoway's appeal should be denied in all respects and costs should be awarded 
toBarney. * 
With respect to Barney's claim, Barney should have been awarded 
prejudgment interest on the amount of the judgment awarded by the Court 
consistent with the law. Bamey is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount 
of $13,423.89, which includes interest from March 1, 1996, to June 7, 1999. That 
amount should be made part of the original judgment and post judgment interest 
should accrue on that amount as well. 
Finally, Bamey requests that he be awarded additional damages for the 
excess wages taken by Siddoway in violation of the agreement that the parties 
were to receive an equal salary commencing April 1, 1989. Bamey is entitled to 
an award of $42,025.00, as set forth in Exhibit 17, with additional interest at the 
rate of 10 percent per annum after February 25, 1999, until June 7, 1999. Bamey 
should be awarded his costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY Submitted this 7th day of March 2000. 
^Larry A. Kirkham 
Attorney for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant 
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Evan A. Schmutz 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A 
Trial Exhibit 17 "Actual Base Salary Summary Not Including 
Bonuses" 
EXHIBIT B 
Trial Exhibit 24 "Record of Lee Barney Stock" 
EXHIBIT C 
Trial Exhibit 25 "STI Net Equity of the Corporation" 
Exhibit D 
Trial Exhibit 27 "STI Loan Receivable from Jon D. Siddoway" 
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EXHIBIT A 
Trial Exhibit 17 "Actual Base Salary Summary Not Including Bonuses" 
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Actual Base Salary Summary 
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Total Excess and Interest $42.025.00. 
Lee Barney Share (25% x $42,025.00) $10,506.00 
The information utlized to prepare this summary was taken from the Standard Tile financial 
statements, Standard Tile corporate tax returns, W-2's, and personal tax returns of Lee Barney and Jon 
Siddoway. Interest is calculated at 10 percent on the basis of U.C.A. §15-1-1. 
Barney's salary for nine (9) months of 1989, was $1,923.00 per month. Siddoway's salary should have been $1,923.00 
per month for the same period of time and for the first two (2) months of 1989. The excess amount was calculated by taking Siddoway's gross 
salary for the nine (9) months and subtracting Barney's salary for nine (9) months and then subtracting an additional two (2) month salary at 
$1,923.00 for each of the two (2) months. Siddoway still took and excess of $13,849.00 as direct salary and bonuses. The salary for both 
parties is to be equal an additional profit or bonuses were to be 75 percent for Siddoway and 25 percent for Barney. In other words, a 
$ 10,000.00 profit or bonus would be divided $7,500.00 to Siddoway and $2,500.00 to Barney. 
The base salary for both parties should have been $1,923.00 per month for each of the twelve (12) months of 1990. 
Siddoway apparently took $2,225.00 per month or roughly $300.00 more per month as base salary than did Barney. Attached hereto as part of 
this summary is a Standard Tile W-2 income summary. 
In 1991, Lee Barney understood that the parties were going to be receiving $2,400.00 per month as a base salary and Mr. 
Barney began receiving that. He received that amount through 1992, and most of 1993. Near the end of the 1993, the base salary was 
increased to $2,500.00 per month. In 1994, the base salary was to be $2,700.00 per month but Lee Barney's first check was only $2,500.00 
with he remaining months being $2,700.00 per month. 
4 
In February of 1996, Jon Siddoway fired Lee Barney. Lee Barney was only paid $2,700.00 per month for the months of 
January and February. Jon Siddoway should have been paid $32,400.00 for 1996, assuming the corporation was operating. Jon Siddo 
claims in his deposition that the corporation stopped operating as of June 30,1996, and Siddoway Enterprises was incorporated and tW ~ 
operating the first part of July, 1996. The excess taken by Siddoway for 1996, would probably be more correct at $20,300.00. f PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard Tile W-2 Income Summary 
YEAR BARNEY SIDDOWAY 
1989 $17,307.00' $36,925.002 
1990 $39,103.00 $73,500.00 
1991 $43,623.05 $74,025.00 
1992 $32,004.06 $38,025.00 
1993 $35,901.15 $48,800.00 
1994 $42,800.00 $62,900.00 
1995 $40,500.00 $55,500.00 
1996 $5,400.00 $36,500.00 
1
 This figure was taken from the W-2 received by Lee Barney from Standard Tile, Inc. in 1989, 
covering a period of nine (9) months. 
2
 This figure was taken from the personal tax return form 22441 of Jon Siddoway. Neidier 
Standard Tile, Jon Siddoway, and/or Tubber Okuda, the accountant for Standard Tile and Mr. Siddoway, could 
produce the 1989, W-2's for Jon Siddoway or any of the financial documents for 1989. 
3w2stnd.til 
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Base Salary for Siddoway and Barney 
YEAR Per Month Per Year 
1989 $1,923.00 (9 months) $17,307.00 
1990 $1,923.00 $23,076.00 
1991 $2,400.00 $28,800.00 
1992 $2,400.00 $28,800.00 
1993 $2,400.00* $29,259.62 
1994 $2,700.002 $32,200.00 
1995 $2,700.00 $32,400.00 
1996 $2,700.00 $32,400.00 
This summary was prepared from information taken from the statements of assets, liabilities an 
equity for Standard Tile, Inc. for the years 1989, through 1990. The 1989, records were unavailable and 
personal tax returns, W-2's, and the corporate tax returns for Standard Tile have also been used. The 
1989, salary of $1,923.00 was taken from Lee Barney's W-2. 
1
 In November of 1993, Lee Barney received salary of $2,500.00 per month. Jon Siddoway had 
previously been taking $2,500.00 per month and in November increased to $2,600.00 per month. In December, 
Siddoway's salary remained at $2,600.00 per month and Lee Barney was given a check for $2,759.62 as salary for 
December. Barney received a $6,000.00 bonus i.e. 25 percent, and Siddoway received an $18,000.00 bonus i.e. 75 
percent. 
2
 Lee Barney's first monthly salary check was $2,500.00 in January of 1994. Jon Siddoway 
received $2,600.00 per month in January. Thereafter, Lee Barney and Jon Siddoway both received $2,700.00 per 
month as base salary. 
3basesly.l&j 
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EXHIBIT B 
Trial Exhibit 24 "Record of Lee Barney Stock" 
H3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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EXHIBIT C 
Trial Exhibit 25 "STI Net Equity of the Corporation" 
HS Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lNational®Brand 45-605 Eye-Ease®_ c f t t ^ -O^^L . ^ A , g 
45-305 2 - Pack 






































<^ju^k *ltnw*$* to*~n. m*% tfc 
P r e p a r e d By 
A p p r o v e d By 
Initials | Date 
"Jinujt^, ', /</%(? 
'
sS£-er^ kjU&JU^v' touuj 
C**Jb# ^fcrdlJ 
^ 
h f ^ X & ^ ' - u A *V*-vv«-cJ 
< i ^ o c A ^ a _ ~ «^  $(>Oj<y 
\£*SZ+$L W ^ S f c J 
V N A - O ' 0 «3* frA^K-A-wJ 
o_ ^ e ^ V - J U U 
1 t4Lrvl ZO.M 
&L*-.'MfLli\ 
\ 3 X - C _ 1«, / * * 1 
pUfcJL si^^JuJ 
1 
N L * & ^ *_ A<^y>-^vjd 
c r v ^ 0— 
. • V V J L A M W 
-.. H M S h . ...J2ajL/\ 
IT ] 
•— — : 1 z — s A 
/ 
k,,, — r 1 1 
rKV 
T 








4 4 T 




——— It 1 1— 
^ ^ T ^ M I 1 1 
"^  I** 1 
r 
O C E S H W A U 
dLjJjll li 
^^LtJLL'M [ 1 
! | T \\y\ 
ill \\\i 
_ Z. n 
^ t H 
<59t> 1 6 4 i 
rnr\ 
1 rn r 
r"N J 
n i 




H4flk| I 11 
IT 
HnTr / l i i 
P rdftfc^ i^^ L 
^4*^^3(1 .1 1 
•y . 















i i i 
1 1 1 i 1 
l l l i l 










I • • • - " 1 1 i i 
i 




rzi j ^ ||. 1 1 1 




j _[_ i i 
~ *s : : 
1 
! 
I N I 
| * DEFENDANT'S T 
If EXHIBIT | 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit D 
Trial Exhibit 27 "STI Loan Receivable from Jon D. Siddoway" 
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